Deviations from accepted practice guidelines and protocols are poorly understood, yet some deviations are likely to be deliberate and carry potential for patient harm. Anaesthetic teams practise in a complex work environment and anaesthetists are unusual in that they both prescribe and administer the drugs they use, allowing scope for idiosyncratic practice. We aimed to better understand the intentions underlying deviation from accepted guidelines during drug administration in simulated cases. An observer recorded events that may have increased the risk of patient harm ('Events of Interest' [EOIs]) during 20 highly realistic simulated anaesthetic cases. In semi-structured interviews, details of EOIs were confirmed with participating anaesthetic teams, and intentions and reasoning underlying the confirmed deviations were discussed. Confirmed details of EOIs were tabulated and we undertook qualitative analysis of interview transcripts. Twenty-four EOIs (69% of 35 recorded) were judged by participants to carry potential for patient harm, and 12 (34%) were judged to be deviations from accepted guidelines (including one drug administration error). Underlying reasons for deviations included a strong sense of clinical autonomy, poor clinical relevance and a lack of evidence for guidelines, ingrained habits learnt in early training, and the influence of peers. Guidelines are important in clinical practice, yet self-identified deviation from accepted guidelines was common in our results, and all but one of these events was judged to carry potential for patient harm. A better understanding of the reasons underlying deviation from accepted guidelines is essential to the design of more effective guidelines and to achieving compliance.
The human and financial cost of preventable adverse events in hospitals is substantial and may exact a greater toll than breast cancer, AIDS, or workplace injuries 1, 2 . Errors in the administration of drugs are one leading cause of such harm. This is of particular concern in anaesthesia due to the potency of the agents used, the multiple drug administrations per anaesthetic, and the large number of anaesthetics provided globally 1, 3, 4 . Unusually, anaesthetists generally prescribe and administer the drugs they use, which reduces the checks that might otherwise mitigate risks, and also provides significant scope for idiosyncratic practices. These factors place a special onus on anaesthetists to practise safely.
Recent initiatives to reduce harm to patients have centred upon the standardisation of practice and the development of evidence-based checklists [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] . The quality of protocols and guidelines in healthcare is variable, but violation of accepted protocols has been associated with increased patient harm [10] [11] [12] [13] . Violations should be distinguished from errors. An error is "the unintentional use of a wrong plan to achieve an aim, or failure to carry out a planned action as intended" 14 . However, a violation is "a deliberate deviation from those practices deemed necessary (by designers, managers and regulatory agencies) to maintain the safe operation of a potentially hazardous system" 15 . The difference lies primarily in intention. Errors involve no intention to depart from an accepted standard and so practitioners cannot avoid errors simply by trying harder. Violations do involve the intention to depart from an accepted standard, so most, if not all, violations should be avoidable 14, 16 . Errors in healthcare have been relatively well studied, but violations are less well understood. However, both constitute important sources of potential patient harm, especially when they occur in combination 15, 17, 18 .
There are various practical, ethical, and legal barriers to the study of violations in healthcare. Furthermore, violations are often not reported during incident monitoring 17, 19 . We have previously used highly realistic simulations in order to study clinical practices without these difficulties [20] [21] [22] . In the present study we aimed to better understand the intentions underlying deviation from accepted guidelines during drug administration in realistic simulated cases. We did this through a discussion of observed deviation events with the practitioners involved. We then explored practitioners' views on guidelines and protocols in general, in the context of these events.
Materials and methods
This study is part of the larger Validating Anaesthesia Simulation-based Error Research (VASER) study and was approved by the Northern Y Regional Ethics Committee, Auckland, New Zealand (Reference No.: NTY/09/01/005).
Participants
In New Zealand, the anaesthesia team typically consists of an anaesthetist and an anaesthetic technician (a trained assistant). All 58 specialist anaesthetists and senior anaesthesia trainees at a large anaesthetic department in a tertiary hospital were invited to participate. In addition, anaesthetic technicians from the same and other local hospitals were invited to participate. All participants gave written informed consent.
The simulations
The study was conducted at the Advanced Clinical Skills Centre, University of Auckland, using mixed methods incorporating observation and interview 23 . We used a realistic operating room (OR) and preoperative assessment room, with real consumables and contemporary anaesthesia and surgical equipment. Considerable attention was given to achieving high levels of realism in all aspects of the environment 24 .
We simulated two cases for each anaesthetic team, modelled on cases that participants would be expected to manage in their normal clinical work. Each case was scripted to last approximately 45 minutes, create a relatively high workload and involve an event for which urgent evaluation and treatment was required. One case involved profound hypotension and hyperkalaemia following decompression of a lower limb compartment syndrome; the other case involved new-onset rapid atrial fibrillation and hypotension in a patient with multiple comorbidities undergoing bowel surgery. Information about the patients was available in clinical notes. In addition, as a drug-checking challenge, a look-alike drug ampoule or pre-filled syringe was placed in an incorrect drug trolley compartment or location during each case.
We staffed the simulated OR with appropriate clinical personnel: the study participants (the anaesthetist and anaesthetic technician), a scrub nurse taking his or her usual role, and experienced simulation centre staff familiar with the OR environment taking the roles of surgeon, circulating nurse, OR coordinator and anaesthetic floor coordinator.
Observable events of interest
We developed a list of 20 observable safety-related behaviours on the basis of three documents: a professional guideline for drug administration during anaesthesia produced by ANZCA, a previous systematic review of evidence-based strategies for the prevention of drug administration error during anaesthesia, and the World Health Organization Safe Surgery Checklist 7, 25, 26 (Table 1) . The list was intended to include behaviours which, if not carried out, may lead to an event representing an increased risk of patient harm, including minor events of interest (EOIs) such as workspace untidiness and major EOIs such as actual drug administration errors.
Conduct of the simulation study day
Following a standardised familiarisation with the environment, the participating anaesthetist was introduced to the simulated patient in the preoperative area and was able to undertake a preoperative assessment. During this Table 1 List of events of interest observable during simulation 19. An accurate record of every drug administration, including the name and dose of the drug is made 20. Errors in intravenous drug administration during anaesthesia are reported and reviewed time the anaesthetic technician was asked to prepare for an anaesthetic. We then asked the anaesthetist to enter the simulated OR and anaesthetise and manage the patient. The simulation ended when the surgical operation was completed. In the Auckland region, some ORs are equipped with SAFERsleep® (SAFERSleep LLC, Nashville, TN, USA), a safety-oriented anaesthetic information management system (AIMS) 27 . SAFERsleep includes an automated drug identity cross-check in which a barcode on the labelled syringe is scanned by a reader and the name of the drug is announced by a pre-recorded voice, and displayed on the anaesthetic record 28 . This meets the recommendation in the ANZCA guideline for a double check of a drug by a second person or device 25 . In other Auckland ORs, anaesthetists make conventional (paper-based) records and administer drugs without technological support. The present study was part of a larger investigation in which we randomised cases to have either the AIMS or conventional methods, but here we do not evaluate the differences between these two approaches to anaesthesia.
Three study members (one per case) observed the anaesthetic teams from behind one-way glass during the simulations, and recorded the details of EOIs using the list in Table 1 . Observers were familiarised with the checklist under supervision before study observation. The simulations were also video recorded from three vantage points, including the anaesthetic work area.
Semi-structured interview
The study day ended with a debrief involving a semistructured interview with the participating anaesthetic team, facilitated by a research team member. The facilitator first established an agreed understanding of the facts (i.e. what actually occurred) and then sought participants' views and intentions in relation to the observed EOIs. If a participant could not recall an event, the relevant section of the video recording was shown to aid recall. For each EOI, the facilitator asked the participants whether they considered it to be a deviation from an accepted guideline, whether it had implications for patient safety, whether it was attributable to simulation, and whether there were any contributing factors. The interview ended with questions about the participants' general views regarding protocols, guidelines and violations ( Table 2 ).
Data analysis
The researcher who conducted each interview transcribed the recording of that interview. The transcripts were imported into the qualitative research tool NVivo9 (QSR International, Melbourne, Victoria) and analysis proceeded in two stages. First, key details of each EOI, confirmed through discussion with participating anaesthetic teams, were extracted from interview transcripts and tabulated. Second, a general inductive approach was used to analyse the complete interview transcripts and to identify content themes 29 . An investigator read all the transcripts and coded the data into preliminary categories. Two sensitising concepts consistent with the semi-structured interview questions were used to guide this process: 1) reasons for deviation from guidelines, and 2) contributing factors for deviation from guidelines 30 . Categories were then grouped into themes. The analysis was reviewed by a second researcher, and illustrative quotations were selected for reporting of results.
Results
We collected data from 20 simulated cases over ten days, between 14 April and 10 July 2009, involving ten anaesthetists and ten anaesthetic technicians. The ten study interviews took approximately 35 minutes each and the transcripts contained a median (range) of 1598 (1175 to 4944) words.
We identified 35 EOIs during observation that may have constituted deviations from accepted practice, with a median (range) of three (two to four) EOIs per anaesthetic team (Table 3 ). Participants believed that these EOIs could harm the patient in 24 of 35 events (69%), were a deviation from accepted guidelines in 12 of 35 (34%), and were at least partly attributable to simulation in two of 35 (6%).
Participants' opinions diverged over which kinds of EOIs were indeed deviations from accepted guidelines. Six EOIs (from five participants) involved the administration of a drug from an unlabelled syringe. One participating team believed that giving an unlabelled drug was a deviation from accepted practice that carried potential to harm the patient. The others thought that when a drug is drawn up and given immediately, as occurred in these instances, labelling is not necessary. A further event involved the addition of potassium to an infusion bag without labelling of the bag. 2. How do you think that we could encourage a culture of following guidelines and protocols?
3. Do you think that deviations from guidelines and protocols are always negative or could they in some scenarios be positive?
Note: this comprised two sets of questions, one regarding events of interest observed during the simulations and one concerning general attitudes to guidelines, protocols and violation.
When using the AIMS, eight participants failed to scan the drug before administration (on a total of nine occasions). In six of these instances, participants agreed that this was a deviation from accepted practice with potential to harm the patient. When using conventional methods (or the AIMS), no participant checked a drug with a second person.
Participants commented that they would only check with a second person when preparing a drug that was unfamiliar, potent or high risk. We observed one drug administration error (pancuronium administered instead of suxamethonium, using conventional methods)-this was attributed by the participant to the influence of simulation, and occurred partly because the ampoule had been placed in an incorrect location in the drug drawer and was similar in appearance to the intended drug. In addition, we noted 13 instances of cluttered work spaces-in 12 of these, participants thought this could potentially cause patient harm, though only three thought it was a deviation from accepted guidelines. We noted five occasions where the anaesthetic technician, rather than the anaesthetist, prepared drugs, but only one of these was judged to carry potential for patient harm (Table 3) .
Qualitative analysis of the interviews identified five themes and 12 categories. Each is reported below with supporting quotations given in Table 4 .
Learnt behaviours 1a. Teaching and supervision
Participating anaesthetists thought the education and clinical supervision of trainees strongly influenced their subsequent adherence to guidelines and protocols. They saw this as particularly important when new procedures were introduced, so that people did things correctly from the beginning. Being taught by someone who didn't follow a guideline themselves was given as a key reason for deviating from that guideline in the participants' own practice. For example, participants who failed to perform the drug identity check before administration when using the AIMS stated they had learned from others to think of the AIMS more as a record keeper than as a safety system.
1b. Difficulties in changing practice
Participants commented on the mental change needed to switch from doing things one way to doing them another, which sometimes led to initial resistance to new guidelines. They said it was difficult to break the habit of a longestablished clinical practice in order to comply with a new guideline, particularly when busy or in a crisis, when they often reverted to old, highly practised habits. Thus, even when they were trying to break an old habit and comply with a new way of doing things, they didn't always succeed.
Attitudes to guidelines 2a. Personal perceptions
Participants expressed various personal perceptions about protocols and guidelines, including positive and negative attitudes towards them in principle. Some felt that anaesthetists are less protocol-driven than their nursing colleagues. 2b. Knowing when to deviate from guidelines Some participants thought that it was just as important to know when to deviate from a guideline, as to know when to apply it, with such a decision being based on an understanding of the limitations of the guideline and patient contraindications.
2c. Accommodating variability in practice
Only one participant thought variability of practice could be negative because it might lower the consistency of performance. Others suggested that variability was a strength and prided themselves on being competent in a wide range of techniques for managing the various difficulties that might arise in patient care. They also thought variability had educational value, and one suggested that it was essential for the advancement of medical science.
Problems with the guidelines 3a. Lack of supporting evidence
Participants were significantly more motivated to follow a guideline or protocol if there was strong evidence to support it than if they believed the evidence base was weak. Reinforcing the evidence for accepted protocols and guidelines through continuous education was seen as important to maintain motivation to do the right thing in their everyday practice.
3b. Poor design
Participants felt that guidelines or protocols did not always reflect clinical reality. Different treatment protocols could contradict each other when a patient had multiple diseases, and guidelines often were impractical in particular clinical situations.
3c. Low clinical relevance
Some participants expressed the opinion that failing to follow guidelines or protocols often had few, if any, clinical consequences and so these guidelines had low relevance to patient care. Much clinical practice is determined by what has worked for a particular clinician in the past, so the introduction of a new protocol contrary to these practices may be seen as unhelpful or simply wrong. Furthermore, guidelines and protocols are often designed with the 'average' patient in mind, so they may not be relevant to a particular patient.
Barriers in implementing guidelines
4a. Practical problems Participants identified several practical factors that made it more difficult to follow a guideline or protocol. These included unfamiliarity with the particular OR, unavailability of materials such as drug labels and trays, and (occasional) difficulties with getting the barcode scanner of the AIMS to scan a drug in a timely way. The layout of the anaesthetic workspace was also mentioned as a source of practical difficulty. Participants mentioned that the location of the anaesthetic machine, drug trolley or injection port at the head of the patient made it difficult to maintain a tidy workspace where drugs are kept in a single location prior to administration.
4b. Time pressure and excessive workload
Under time pressure, some participants found it difficult to continue doing things according to guidelines, and tended instead to revert to old habits. Others stopped doing tasks perceived as "unnecessary", and thought that continuing to follow the guideline would simply have added to their workload. Under time pressure, some participants thought that delegating tasks the anaesthetist would otherwise do themselves was an acceptable strategy to share the workload.
Cultural influences 5a. Top-down influences
Participants commented on the generally positive influence of hospital management and senior colleagues on their practice. Often a change of practice and an encouragement of the culture of protocols and guidelines came from "the top". However, this didn't always translate to change in the workplace.
5b. Influence of peers
Participants thought that the attitudes of their colleagues were a substantial determinant of acceptable practice. Some reported difficulty in gaining enthusiastic support for certain safety measures from other staff. They pointed to differences between countries, noting that in the United Kingdom it is accepted that an anaesthetic technician may draw up all an anaesthetist's drugs for him or her ahead of time, but not in New Zealand.
Discussion
During 20 highly realistic simulated cases, we identified 12 events that were considered by participants to constitute deviations from an accepted guideline. Despite substantial variation in the perceptions of participants towards accepted practice and of the value of guidelines, all but one of these agreed deviation events was judged to carry potential for patient harm. An additional 13 events not considered to be deviations from an accepted guideline were also judged by participants to carry potential for patient harm. The underlying reasons for deviations from guidelines included a strong sense of clinical autonomy, poor clinical relevance and a lack of an evidence base for guidelines, ingrained habits learnt in early training, and the influence of peers.
Only two (6%) of the 35 EOIs identified in this study were attributed to simulation, so overall our data probably do represent clinical practice reasonably well. This is consistent with formal validity checks we have conducted in the same setting comparing anaesthetists' behaviour in simulation with that in the clinical environment 24 . In fact, it is arguable that even these two "simulation-artefact" events do occur in clinical settings (Table 3 ). Untidy workplaces are common during anaesthesia [31] [32] [33] . The drug administration error seen in this study was attributed to the influence of simulation because the ampoule was placed in an incorrect location in the drug drawer. In fact, drug administration errors often occur in precisely these circumstances in clinical practice, sometimes with serious consequences for patients 14, 34 .
Limitations of this study include the possibility that, despite its realism, practices seen in simulated cases might not represent those in a clinical setting. We used only a single coder during each structured observation, but this approach has been successful in previous similar work, and in addition we were able to employ the qualitative trustworthiness technique of member checking by confirming observed details with participants before proceeding with interviews 30, 35 . When using purposive sampling of diverse participants, saturation typically occurs after 10 to 12 interviews, and may occur with as few as four interviewees, when (as in our study) experts are asked about their own field of expertise-so our sample of 20 participants seems adequate 36, 37 . Strengths include our structured observations that used a list of observable events based on previously published work and an established guideline, and our contemporaneous interviews that focused on recent events while memories were fresh. Observational work often relies on the observer's interpretation of events, without including the intentions or reasoning of the participants being observed. However, violations are inherently connected with intentions and so our study began with the observed events, but then allowed the intentions behind these actions to be explained and clarified by the participants who made them. All anaesthetists participating in this study were fellows or trainees of ANZCA and so were obliged to be familiar with ANZCA guidelines. Simulation also circumvents many of the medico-legal implications of observing deviations from accepted practice in a clinical setting.
Some of the factors identified as contributing to deviations from guidelines were technical or practical, including layout difficulties in the positioning of the anaesthetic trolley, the anaesthetic machine and the head of the patient. These factors can be mitigated by redesigning equipment and procedures. The layout of equipment in our simulations reflected that in the participants' operating rooms, so this information has direct relevance for clinical practice.
We observed considerable variation in the practices and opinions of our participants. Care certainly should be tailored to reflect variations in circumstances or between patients-in this respect, healthcare is less amenable to standardisation than many other high-technology endeavours 8, 38, 39 . However, because we used simulation, these participants were all anaesthetising exactly the same two 'patients' in exactly the same OR, so the variation we observed could not have reflected differences between patients or in circumstances. Instead, our observations add to a considerable body of evidence that suggests variation in healthcare that reflects idiosyncratic opinion supported by a claim to clinical autonomy based on qualifications, experience and position [40] [41] [42] [43] . We think such autonomy ought to be tempered by evidence, or at least by consensus generated by appropriate organisations through the development of well-designed guidelines and protocols 8 .
One of the greatest difficulties in studying violations or deviations from accepted practice in healthcare lies in determining which events in fact qualify as such 17 . This is because there are few universally accepted single best ways to perform any particular procedure, and guidelines are explicitly just that, guides rather than prescriptive standards. This is why in our study we let participants determine for themselves which events they considered to be deviations from accepted guidelines. The degree of compliance with a guideline or protocol that is considered acceptable is often influenced by context 44 . For example, the ANZCA guideline for the safe administration of injectable drugs states that "all drugs should be labelled" 25 . There were several failures to do this in our study, and some participants explained these instances with reference to a different national recommendation which states that, if a drug is drawn up and administered immediately, without leaving the anaesthetist's hand, labelling is not essential 45 . However, labelling is a requirement for the identity checking of a drug by means of barcoding and an AIMS 27, 28 .
Many minor violations are, of themselves, inconsequential. Some reflect poorly designed protocols or guidelines. However, there is growing evidence that even minor failures in care can, cumulatively, influence outcomes [46] [47] . Violations may also lead to a gradual migration of organisational culture and undue toleration of deviance which can increase an organisation's exposure to risk 48 . Recent successes in dramatically reducing infection associated with central venous lines and complications associated with surgery illustrate the potential value of formalising and actively implementing evidence-based consensus on best care 6, 7, 49 .
Conclusion
In conclusion, anaesthetists deviated from accepted guidelines 12 times during their management of 20 simulated cases, and it seems likely that they would do the same in clinical settings. In addition, twice as many events, including all but one that was considered a deviation, were also give the drugs that are not an emergency problem, and when they get stressed and it's happening fast, or whatever, they'll skip that step. (Anaesthetist 9) Sometimes it will be that time-pressure makes the protocol less easy to be applied because you want to circumvent anything that is holding you up and just do it quickly which might mean breaching a protocol. (Anaesthetist 5) Personally I think that it is entirely appropriate for the tech to be drawing up adrenaline… It's a technical task, it's very simple to do. And if you happen to draw up adrenaline you can practically guarantee that the anaesthetist is going to be task-saturated and the last thing that they need to be doing is to turn around and do some fairly minimal task when actually they need all their attention on big picture. (Technician 5)
Cultural influences a. Top-down influences
One of the protocol deviations that I'm often guilty of is the one for diluting phenylephrine… I'm thinking that the department didn't have enough experience with phenylephrine and chose a too dilute dilution. (Anaesthetist 8 deemed to have potential to cause patient harm. Reasons for deviations reflected a strong sense of clinical autonomy on the part of at least some of our participants, but also some important barriers to implementing guidelines. Most participants seemed to value guidelines and protocols, provided they were clinically relevant, well designed and based on strong evidence, and were not too difficult to implement. The early training of anaesthetists and the influence of peers were identified as particularly important in achieving compliance with guidelines and protocols, and in promoting safer anaesthetic practice. We suggest that taking into account the underlying reasons for deviations from guidelines identified in our results may improve the design of guidelines and protocols, and also increase rates of adherence.
